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Abstract 
We show that the cyclical adjustment strategy used in a large stream of literature on the 
conventional or data-based analysis of fiscal policy fails to correct for cyclical effects in 
the case of expenditure-GDP-ratios so that the finding of expansionary austerity in this 
literature is based on reverse causality, i.e. increasing GDP causally decreases 
expenditure-GDP-ratios and not vice versa. Proposing a new version of the 
“Blanchard”-method of cyclical adjustment, correcting for this error, and replicating 
Alesina and Ardagna (2010), the expansionary effects of fiscal consolidations disappear 
or turn into opposite. These findings may help understanding some of the controversies 
in the recent literature and contribute to a rehabilitation of the conventional approach 
and the “Blanchard method” to compute cyclically-adjusted government budget data. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the lively debated issues in today’s macroeconomic research is the question of 
the effects of fiscal policy. Since the European fiscal crisis, this debate gained political 
relevance because policy-makers around the world have been in search of an efficient 
way to reduce government debt levels. The idea of an “expansionary fiscal contraction” 
seemed to be one tempting solution for the challenges of the time. 
Macroeconomic textbooks in the Keynesian tradition however suggest that fiscal 
expansions increase, while fiscal consolidations contract aggregate demand. A reduction 
of government deficit levels would thus decrease economic growth in the short run. On 
the other hand, a substantial amount of research on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
consolidations challenges this conventional wisdom and finds that fiscal adjustments 
may have expansionary economic effects (‘expansionary austerity hypothesis’). This 
view was first expressed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) who discussed the 
expansionary effects of cases of fiscal adjustments in Ireland and Denmark during the 
1980s. Alesina and Perotti (1995)
2
 found first evidence for the expansionary austerity 
hypothesis in a large panel of OECD countries. In the aftermath, a number of papers 
built on the approach used in A&P (1995) to investigate the effects of fiscal policy.
3
 
According to this stream of literature, fiscal consolidations are likely to be expansionary 
if the adjustment mainly takes place on the expenditure side, while tax increases are 
more likely to be contractionary (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010, and 2013).
4
 
To measure discretionary changes in fiscal policy, A&P investigate changes in the 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance (hereafter: conventional or data-based approach) 
and apply a cyclical adjustment strategy based on the so-called “Blanchard method” 
(hereafter: A&P approach).
5
 
Critique of this approach is not new. In a comment on A&P, Kollintzas (1995) criticised 
that the cyclical adjustment strategy used in A&P (1995) might not capture the cyclical 
effects of the government budget balance so that the resulting “Blanchard Fiscal 
                                                          
2
 Hereafter A&P. 
3
 See for instance Alesina and Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010, and 2013), and Ardagna 
(2004 and 2009).  
4
 Hereafter A&A (1998, 2010, and 2013). 
5
 The cyclical adjustment strategy is motivated by Blanchard (1990) and described by Alesina and Perotti 
(1995).  
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Indicator” (BFI) might not be an appropriate measure of a discretionary change in fiscal 
policy. Moreover, Giavazzi (1995) suggests that the results in A&P are influenced by 
accompanying monetary policies, in form of exchange rate devaluations, for example in 
the case of Ireland 1987.
6
 
At the beginning of the European fiscal crisis, there was a renewed interest in the effects 
of fiscal consolidations and potential expansionary effects. Against this background, 
A&A (2010 and 2013) provided new evidence on expansionary effects of fiscal 
consolidations in a panel of OECD countries. These studies have been frequently 
debated in the recent literature.
7
 Different from A&A (2010), Leigh et al. (2010) and 
Guajardo et al. (2014) analysed historical records of fiscal adjustments and contrasted 
the conventional approach with the historical approach. Their results did not share the 
expansionary austerity view. 
Guajardo et al. (2014) illustrate that the fiscal indicator as used in A&A (2010) is 
correlated with GDP forecast revisions. The authors state that estimates based on the 
conventional approach appear to be biased towards overestimating expansionary effects, 
since the conventional approach entails one-offs operations in the budget balance. They 
also criticise that the cyclical adjustment strategy of A&A (2010) neglects the effects of 
budgetary effects of changes in asset prices. Jayadev and Konczal (2010) and Jordà and 
Taylor (2016) illustrate that the successful cases of fiscal adjustments in A&A (2010) 
are in most instances associated with an economic upswing, an analysis that questions 
the exogeneity of the fiscal indicator used in the data-based approach. In this line, De-
Cos and Moral-Benito (2013) illustrate that fiscal adjustment episodes as identified by 
A&A (2010) are not exogenous to economic growth and treat fiscal consolidations as 
weakly exogenous or predetermined, pointing to potential feedback effects and reverse 
causality. However, De-Cos and Moral-Benito (2016) illustrate that the cases of fiscal 
adjustments identified by the narrative approach are not exogenous to GDP, too. 
To account for potential endogeneity in the study of A&A (2010), Holden and Midthjell 
(2013) and Yang et al. (2015) applied alternative measures of discretionary change and 
illustrate that the positive effect of fiscal adjustments disappears after applying 
                                                          
6
 The same critique holds for the episodes examined in Giavazzi and Pagano (1990).  
7
 Refer to Blyth (2013) and Stiglitz (2016) for a comprehensive discussion and critique of expansionary 
fiscal consolidations and their relevance in the European fiscal crisis.  
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alternative strategies of adjusting budgetary data for cyclical effects, rather than 
adjusting with the method used in A&A. 
After the Blanchard method used in A&A (2010) has been criticised for the (non-) 
recognition of fluctuations in asset prices and their effect on the budget balance 
(Guajardo et al., 2014), Yang et al. (2015) developed an indicator of fiscal impulse 
which controls for asset price fluctuations and discovered that the results are more in-
line with the narrative approach when the changes in the fiscal stance is measured with 
this alternative strategy. Very close to the study at hand, Holden and Midthjell (2013) 
discussed potential reverse causality in the study of A&A (2010) and illustrate that 
reductions in government spending are not more likely to be successful in terms of 
reducing government debt, compared to tax increases, if the CAPB is estimated with a 
modified strategy, rather than the strategy used by A&A. However, Holden and Midtjell 
(2013) as well as Yang et al. (2015) apply newly developed strategies to adjust for 
cyclical effects rather than applying standard methods of cyclical adjustments and do 
not show whether their assumptions are more in line with the literature, compared to the 
assumptions on the cyclical sensitivity of the government budget made in A&P (1995), 
as well as A&A (1998, 2010, and 2013). Moreover, Holden and Midthjell (2013) focus 
on the question of whether fiscal policies are effective in reducing debt, rather than 
examining the effect of the cyclical adjustment strategy on the estimated fiscal 
multiplier. To this end, no previous study discussed why the Blanchard method as used 
in the literature following A&P is in conflict with standard assumptions on automatic 
stabilizers and how fixing this conflict influences the estimated fiscal multiplier in 
conventional analyses of fiscal policy. 
This paper builds on the previous literature and illustrates that studies using the BFI in 
the tradition of A&P as an indicator of fiscal impulse are biased towards expansionary 
austerity because the cyclical adjustment strategy does not correctly adjust the budget 
balance for cyclical effects. This cyclical adjustment problem in the method proposed 
by A&P and applied in A&A (1998, 2010, and 2013) is particularly pronounced in the 
case of government expenditures. This explains why the estimated fiscal multipliers in 
the literature based on the A&P method are biased towards expansionary results and 
why this is particularly pronounced in the case of cuts in government expenditure. The 
remainder of this paper is structured as follows: 
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Section 2 of this paper illustrates that the strategy pioneered by A&P is in conflict with 
standard assumptions made in the literature on cyclical adjustment. Different from the 
assumptions proposed in the literature, A&P implicitly assume unit-elastic government 
expenditures with respect to GDP, while it is common to assume inelastic government 
expenditure (other than transfers). To fix the incomplete cyclical-adjustment problem, 
an augmented specification of the BFI is proposed. Section 3 summarizes the theoretical 
discussion and proposes testable hypotheses on how the different strategies to adjust for 
cyclical effects influence the estimated fiscal  multiplier. The following empirical parts 
test these hypotheses based on the dataset used in A&A (2010) and contrast the A&P 
approach with a CAPB based on a standard cyclical adjustment strategy and the 
augmented version of the BFI.
8
 
Section 4 provides evidence for the hypothesis that the fiscal indicator as used in A&A 
(2010) entails a pro-cyclical pattern and is positively correlated with the output gap, 
while the same is not true for the CAPB of the OECD or the augmented version of the 
Blanchard method. As predicted in section 2, this pattern appears to be particularly 
pronounced for the expenditure-GDP-ratio (if calculated with the A&P method). 
Section 5 analyzes large changes of the output gap and illustrates that episodes with 
large changes in the output gap are very likely to be picked as an episode of large 
discretionary change in A&A (2010) if the A&P method is used, rather than the CAPB, 
as computed by the OECD or the augmented version of the BFI. 
Replicating A&A (2010) in section 6, the estimated effects are compared (based on the 
CAPB used in A&A, the CAPB of the OECD, and the augmented BFI. In line with the 
hypotheses formulated in section 3, it is shown that the results based on the A&A 
measure provide evidence for expansionary effects of fiscal contractions in the case of 
expenditure cuts, while this effect is contractionary after using standard assumptions to 
correct for cyclical effects. Section 7 computes dynamic effects of fiscal policy based on 
the three strategies to compute the CAPB. It is shown that there is a qualitative 
difference in the estimated fiscal multiplier if standard methods are used to compute the 
CAPB, rather than the method proposed by A&A. Section 8 concludes. 
                                                          
8
 In the empirical part of the paper I use the same data and definitions as A&A (2010), precisely the 
OECD Economic Outlook, No. 84, as applied in A&A (2010) and in de Coz and Moral-Benito (2013). As 
a standard cyclical adjustment strategy I obtain cyclically-adjusted data from the same source, based on 
the method proposed in Girouard and André (2005).  
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2. Cyclical adjustment and reverse causality 
 
2.1. Cyclical adjustment and the data-based approach 
 
To analyse the effects of changes in fiscal policy on GDP, the conventional (data-based) 
approach applies regressions of GDP growth rates ty  in year t on changes in the 
cyclically-adjusted primary budget balances (as a ratio to GDP) tcapb : 
 
(1)    ttt capby    
 
The idea of this approach is quite straightforward: coefficient   captures the effect of a 
change in fiscal policy (measured as a percentage point of GDP) on GDP growth rates, 
i.e, the fiscal multiplier. This approach provides unbiased estimates of the fiscal 
multiplier if the tCAPB  is assumed to be unaffected by GDP growth (no reverse 
causality). Because the budget balance is influenced by a number of factors (that might 
be correlated with the economic cycle), the question of reverse causation has often been 
discussed in the literature. Foremost, Perotti (2013) highlights two potential pitfalls of 
empirical papers on the effects of fiscal policy using the conventional approach, the 
“countercyclical response problem”, and the “imperfect cyclical adjustment problem”. 
Since the cyclical adjustment strategy aims at controlling for the automatic feedback 
effects of GDP on the budget balance, the most obvious reason why the budget balance 
responds to GDP seems to be controlled for, however, an “incomplete cyclical 
adjustment problem” arises when the cyclical adjustment strategy applied does not 
appropriately account for cyclical effects in the budget balance, f. e. because it does not 
take into account changes in asset prices. In this context, a number of articles discuss 
the influence of asset prices on the budget balance.
9
 While the cyclical adjustment 
strategy controls for automatic effects of GDP on the budget balance, another non-
automatic effect might arise through discretionary policy measures. 
                                                          
9
 See Morris and Schuknecht (2007) and Yang et al. (2015) on how asset price fluctuations might 
influence the budget balance and the estimated fiscal multiplier in the conventional approach.  
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For example, it is possible that systematic counter-cyclical policy responses might 
contribute to the positive relationship between the budget balance and economic growth 
(“counter-cyclical response problem”). Accordingly, the estimated coefficient   is an 
unbiased assessment of the fiscal multiplier only under the assumption of no “imperfect 
cyclical adjustment problem” and no “counter-cyclical response problem”. In the 
following, we focus on the incomplete cyclical-adjustment problem in the literature 
using the conventional approach and the Blanchard-method to adjust for cyclical effects 
in the tradition of A&P (1995). 
 
2.2. The Blanchard method in the tradition of A&P 
 
Typical cyclical adjustment strategies (as for instances applied in the OECD economic 
outlook) aims at controlling for automatic feedback from changes in the economic cycle 
to the budget balance using an estimated budget sensitivity (to the output gap) g : 
 
(2)     tgtt GapPBCAPB    
 
Here, Gap represents the output gap (as a percentage of potential GDP), where potential 
GDP is to be measured with a production function or filtering methods, what is a 
potential source of measurement error. Since a number of authors have been skeptical 
regarding the reliability of estimations of potential output and thus the output gap, 
Blanchard (1990) suggests using the unemployment rate as a natural indicator of the 
economic cycle rather than estimates of the output gap
10
: 
 
(3)     tutt URPBCAPB    
 
A&P (1995) pioneered data-based analyses and the so-called “Blanchard method” to 
adjust the budget balance for cyclical effects with estimations of u . They refer to the 
so computed change in the fiscal stance as the “Blanchard fiscal indicator” (equation 3). 
                                                          
10
 According to Blanchard (1990) an estimation of the level of potential GDP is not necessary anyway, 
since we are interested in changes in fiscal policy rather than levels. 
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The basic question in the article at hand is how to measure the budget sensitivity (with 
respect to unemployment) u , and whether and how the cyclically adjustment strategy 
proposed in A&P is in line with the assumptions made in the literature on cyclical 
adjustment, particularly whether there are potential pitfalls at the spending- or revenue 
side. Fedelino et al. (2009) is referred to as a benchmark study on cyclical adjustment, 
even though there are other pioneering discussions of cyclical adjustment strategies,  for 
example Girouard and André (2005). According to Fedelino et al. (2009), the CAPB 
consists of cyclically-adjusted revenues net of cyclically-adjusted expenditure, both 
adjusted with their respective sensitivity to GDP (here, 
P
tY represents potential GDP)
11
:  
 
(4)     
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The literature on cyclical adjustment proposes the following simplifying assumptions: 
unit-elastic revenues (responding to the tax base with an elasticity of 1), R  = 1, and 
inelastic government expenditure ( G  = 0). If so, equation (4) can be simplified to 
 
(5)     t
t
P
t
tt G
Y
Y
RCAPB 








  
 
To adjust the budget balance for cyclical effects, it appears to be reasonable to adjust 
revenues but not expenditure. However, since some expenditure items - as in the case of 
unemployment benefits - are affected by the economic cycles, it might be necessary to 
take into account elastic transfer payments (because unemployment benefits increase in 
an economic downturn). Following this line, Alesina and Perotti (1995) assume that 
social transfers to households, as well as revenues (and only transfers and revenues) 
respond to cyclical effects. Consequently, A&P apply the cyclical adjustment procedure 
to taxes and transfers, whereas expenditures other than transfers remain unadjusted. 
                                                          
11
 Note that the CAB in this illustration is not calculated as a ratio to GDP. 
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According to A&P
12
 and equivalent to equation (3), the BFI is 
 
(6)    ttTrttRtt GURTrURRCAPB  )(   
 
Rather than computing estimates of potential GDP and output elasticities, here it is 
necessary to compute estimates of the elasticities of transfers and tax revenues with 
respect to unemployment ( R  and Tr ). 
To do so, for each country A&P regress social transfers as a share of GDP
13
 on two time 
trends (one for the full period and one for the period after 1975 to control for a potential 
structural break)
14
 and on the unemployment rate: 
 
(7)    ttTrt eURtrendatrendaaTr  752110  
 
Then A&P estimate what the transfers would be in period t if unemployment rates were 
the same as in the previous year: 
 
(8)   ttTrtt eURtrendatrendaaURTr



  17521101)(   
 
Here, 0

a , 1

a , 2

a , and 

Tr  represent estimated coefficients (and 

e  is the residual) of 
equation (7). The difference between unemployment-adjusted transfers )( 1tt URTr  
according to equation (8) and previous’ years’ transfers 1tTr  is regarded as a measure 
of the change in cyclically-adjusted transfers (equivalent to equation 6). 
 
(9)     tTrtt URTrCATr 

  
The elasticity of transfers with respect to unemployment 

Tr  is estimated with equation 
(7). The same procedure is applied for revenues to achieve unemployment-adjusted 
                                                          
12
 This definition remains relatively similar to the follow up papers, as e. g. in A&A (1998, 2010, 2013). 
13
 Note that in A&P the fiscal variables are expressed as ratios to GDP. 
14
 In more recent studies, the second trend is neglected (see A&A, 2010 and 2013).  
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revenues ( )( 1tt URR  ). With the construction of  )( 1tt URTr  and )( 1tt URR , A&P 
estimate the primary deficit that would have prevailed in period t if unemployment 
would be the same rate as in year t-1. According to equation (6), the BFI (changes in 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance) is the difference between the unemployment 
adjusted measure of the primary balance (here, all budget items other than taxes and 
transfers as a ratio to GDP remain unadjusted) and the previous year’s primary balance. 
 
2.3. Scaling and the incomplete cyclical adjustment problem 
 
The definition of the BFI, as defined above, however, is in conflict with standard 
methods to compute cyclically-adjusted budget balances, for example, the OECD 
approach (Girouard, André, 2005) or as described in Fedelino et al. (2009). The reason 
for this is that the Blanchard method - according to A&P - does not adjust only revenue 
and expenditure, but revenue and expenditure as a ratio of GDP. To use the variables in 
data-based analyses of fiscal policy it is helpful to scale the variables and express the 
CAPB as a ratio of potential GDP (as it is done in the literature). In doing so, following 
Fedelino et al. (2009), equation (4) and (5) will have to be modified: 
 
(10)
)1()1(
11
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Note that gap represents the output gap as a ratio of potential GDP. Again, assuming 
unit-elastic revenues R  = 1 and inelastic government expenditure G  = 0, equation 
(10) can be simplified to 
 
(11)     )1( t
t
t
t
t
t gap
Y
G
Y
R
capb   
 
The result is different from the CAPB without scaling in equation (5). Using revenues 
and expenditures as a ratio of GDP, standard assumptions would suggest adjusting 
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expenditure (as a ratio of GDP), rather than revenue (as a ratio of GDP).
15
 It will not be 
necessary to adjust revenues if the variables are expressed as ratios of GDP, since 
revenues are expected to have the same growth rates as GDP (if the elasticity would be 
one). After scaling however, there is a strong need to adjust expenditures (if 
expenditures would be inelastic). 
 
2.4. Incomplete cyclical adjustment and reverse causality 
 
Using equation (10) and (1) to measure the effect of fiscal policy on growth gives 
 
(12)  tt
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If R  = 1 and G  = 0 
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Accordingly, government expenditure as a ratio of GDP needs to be corrected for 
cyclical effects, however, following A&P and correcting only taxes and transfers as a 
ratio of GDP, the estimated CAPB (as a ratio of GDP) includes cyclical effects (in the 
denominator) and consists of (adjusted) revenues as a ratio of GDP, ( tCAR ), net of 
(adjusted) transfers as a ratio of GDP ( tCATr ), net of the ratio of (unadjusted) 
government expenditure (other than transfers) to GDP ( tE / tY ): 
 
(14)   t
t
t
ttt u
Y
E
CATrCARY 







   
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 In this line A&P note that using the primary deficit as a share of GDP “is not a bad approximation as 
long as expenditures and revenues are close to being unit elastic to GDP”. Indeed, following their 
methodology, implicitly they assume expenditure to be unit-elastic, what is in conflict with standard 
assumptions on cyclical adjustment, in the case of expenditures.  
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Under the assumption that government spending (other than transfers) does not respond 
to cyclical effects, by approximation, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio behaves inversely 
proportional to the output gap:  
 
(15)    tttttt uGapeCATrCARY  )1(  
 
Where te  is the structural ratio of expenditure (other than transfers) to potential GDP. It 
is now obvious that the ratio of government expenditure other than transfers can be 
influenced by two separate factors, discretionary policy changes that influence the 
structural expenditure ratio ( te ) and cyclical effects ( tGap ). Assuming no policy 
changes ( tCAR =0, tCATr =0, as well as te =0), and under the assumption that 
output growth is a sum of (constant) potential output growth c and changes in the output 
gap ( tt GapcY  ), equation (15) can be simplified to:  
 
(16)   tttt uGapeGapc    
 
It is now obvious that an increase in the output gap ( Gap ) influences both sides of 
equation (16), even without any discretionary policy change. The conventional BFI 
however would interpret an economic upswing (increase in the output gap) as a 
discretionary reduction in government spending.  
 
2.5. Improving the Blanchard method 
 
The simplest way of solving the reverse causality problem would be to use expenditures 
not as a ratio to GDP, but as a ratio to potential or trend GDP. In the following, we 
present an alternative (augmented) specification of the BFI, where all budget items that 
are supposed to be inelastic (or close to being inelastic, as government expenditure and 
revenue other than taxes and social security contributions) are deviated by trend GDP, 
while the items that are supposed to be unit elastic (or close to unit elastic, as taxes and 
social contributions), are treated as proposed in A&P. With this single exception, the 
augmented BFI is computed exactly the same way as proposed in A&P and A&A.
16
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 I thank Olivier Blanchard for suggesting this in a comment on a previous version of the paper. 
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3. Hypotheses  
 
This section explores how different assumptions on the elasticities R  and G  would 
influence estimates of parameter   in conventional analyses on fiscal policy. Basically, 
ignoring other pitfalls (countercyclical response problem and changes in asset prices), 
regressions of equation (12) provide unbiased estimates of parameter   if the 
elasticities R  and G  are estimated correctly. On the other hand, if the method applied 
does not correctly adjust for cyclical effects, this would affect the correlation of the 
CAPB-ratio to the output gap and the estimated multiplier. Table 1 depicts how 
erroneous assumptions on R  and G  would affect the estimated results of equation 12. 
To summarize, following the standard assumptions, that R  = 1 and G =0 or G < 0, 
the consequence for the estimated fiscal multiplier is particularly pronounced in the case 
of expenditures. However, if R > 1, an imperfect cyclical adjustment problem will not 
only decrease the estimated multiplier in the case of government expenditure but also 
decrease the estimated multiplier in the case of taxes. In this case, the consequence of 
finding evidence for expansionary austerity will be particularly likely. From the above 
analysis, the following testable hypotheses are obtained: 
 
1.) The BFI is correlated with changes in the output gap, while other fiscal 
indicators based on standard assumptions are not (or less). 
2.) This correlation is particularly pronounced in the case of changes in expenditure 
(per GDP) and less pronounced in the case of changes in revenues (per GDP). 
3.) The resulting estimated fiscal multiplier (using equation 1) is small (or even 
negative) if the BFI is used as fiscal impulse, compared to results based on 
standard assumptions (the CAPB as used in the OECD Economic Outlook based 
on Girouard and André, 2005, or the augmented BFI). 
4.) Differences in estimates of the fiscal multiplier are particularly pronounced in 
the case of expenditures and less pronounced in the case of revenues. 
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4. Endogeneity of fiscal indicators  
 
This section analyzes and compares the cyclical behavior of the BFI (as estimated by 
A&A, 2010) with ΔCAPB, as calculated by the OECD. Since section 2 has shown that 
the BFI suffers from imperfect cyclical adjustment, hypothesis (1) is that the BFI entails 
a (positive) cyclical pattern. Figure 1 compares a) changes in the CAPB (estimated 
according to A&P), and b) according to the definitions of the OECD with changes in the 
output gap, since an imperfect c.a. problem would result in a (more) cyclical behavior of 
ΔCAPB.17 
Figure 1 (c and d) depicts the cyclical behavior of cyclically adjusted government 
revenues (adjusted with the A&P method and the OECD method), and Figure 1 (e and 
f) shows the comparable behavior of expenditures. Figure 1 a) and b) show that the 
fiscal indicators measured according to A&P depict a more cyclical pattern, compared 
to the OECD fiscal indicator (hypothesis 1). While this pattern is not visible for 
revenues (1 c), it is particularly pronounced in the case of expenditures (hypothesis 2). 
We quantitatively explore the cyclical pattern of the fiscal indicators ΔFit in a panel 
dataset (country i and year t) with regressions of the following form
18
  
 
(17)    ΔFit = µi + λt +𝛾 ΔGapit + uit 
 
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients 𝛾. For comparison, Table 2 includes the 
unadjusted primary balance as another reference. As expected, it is shown that the 
unadjusted primary balance entails a cyclical pattern (no cyclical adjustment). This 
pattern seems to be lower but persistent in the A&P measure (imperfect cyclical 
adjustment), while the CAPB of the OECD appears to be uncorrelated to changes in the 
economic cycle. The augmented BFI even depict a countercyclical behavior. Looking at 
government revenues, the unadjusted series are negatively correlated to the output gap, 
                                                          
17
 The data used in this paper is from the same source as used in A&A (2010), obtained from the OECD 
Economic Outlook no. 84. The c.a. procedure of the OECD is described in Girouard and André (2005). 
18
 Guajardo et al. (2014) analyze fiscal cyclicality in a comparable framework to show that the CAPB (as 
used in A&A) obtain a cyclical pattern, while the narrative measure of fiscal activity does not. Different 
from Guajardo et al. (2014) I do not use narrative measures of fiscal policy as a reference, but CAPB 
based on standard definitions, as provided by the OECD, and use the change in the output gap as cyclical 
indicator rather than GDP growth rate revisions. 
 15   
 
pointing to a short-run elasticity of < 0. However, after applying any cyclical adjustment 
procedure, the cyclicality of revenues disappears. 
However, as proposed by hypothesis 2, the indicators of government expenditures (as a 
ratio of GDP) are negatively associated with the economic cycle, which is strongly 
pronounced in the case of the unadjusted indicators. Adjusting the expenditure ratio 
with the Blanchard-method (A&P), the counter-cyclical pattern remains at a slightly 
lower level, while the relationship disappears after applying the OECD measure and 
even turns into opposite after applying the augmented version of the BFI. Thus, the 
A&P method does not sufficiently control for cyclical effects in government 
expenditure, as suspected in equation (15).
19
 
 
5. Large recessions and expansions 
A&A (2010) identify episodes of large changes in fiscal policy. According to their 
definition, an episode of a large fiscal stimulus is an episode when the BFI (primary 
deficit, c.a. with the Blanchard method) increases by more than 1.5 pp. of GDP in the 
same year, while an episode of a large fiscal adjustment is an episode when the BFI 
(primary deficit, c.a. with the Blanchard method) decreases by more than 1.5 pp. of 
GDP. Following the hypotheses above, it is conceivable that the selection of these 
episodes is endogenous to economic growth. In particular, the identification as an 
episode of large fiscal stimulus will be influenced by negative changes in the output 
gap, while positive changes in the output gap will increase the likelihood of identifying 
this episode as a large fiscal consolidation. 
Table 3 shows the 40 largest cases of economic recessions (negative changes in the 
output gap) in OECD history (in the dataset of A&A, 2010). While this selection 
focuses on episodes during the oil price crises of 1975 and 1981, some of these episodes 
are selected as large episodes of fiscal expansion, according to A&A (2010). To test 
whether this selection is based on the cyclical adjustment strategy of A&P, the BFI in 
these episodes is compared with the CAPB (c.a. with OECD method) and it is shown 
that the CAPB, as estimated with the OECD method, identifies several large recessions 
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 The results are very much in line if we use GDP growth as an alternative cyclical indicator, rather than 
the output gap. 
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as episodes of discretionary fiscal stimulus, however several of the episodes identified 
by A&A (2010) are not large expansionary episodes if the CAPB of the OECD is used. 
For instance, Canada in 1982 and 1991, as well as Belgium and France in 1975 did not 
increase the CAPB by more than 1.5. percent, while A&A (2010) identify these years as 
episodes of large fiscal expansions (because the BFI increases by > 1.5 percent). This 
selection points to the two problems highlighted by Perotti (2013), the countercyclical 
response problem (a), as well as the incomplete cyclical adjustment problem (b). 
First, the countercyclical response problem (a) appears if fiscal policy behaves 
countercyclical and increases deficits as a consequence of an economic recession. Table 
3 depicts that this problem appears in both cases, whether we rely on the BFI or the 
CAPB. Governments tend to increase the CAPB in periods of economic slack as a 
countercyclical policy response, whether the cyclical adjustment strategy is the 
Blanchard method or the OECD method. This countercyclical response problem is one 
reason for the critique of the data-based approach. However, the CAPB (OECD method) 
selects substantially fewer recessions as episodes of fiscal stimuli, compared to the BFI. 
This, secondly, points to an incomplete cyclical adjustment problem (b) for the BFI 
(hypothesis 1). Since this article focuses on the question of how to correct for cyclical 
effects and whether an incomplete cyclical adjustment influences the results of the fiscal 
multiplier, we do not elaborate on the countercyclical response problem in more detail, 
but focus on the incomplete cyclical adjustment problem. 
While the BFI selects 15 of the 40 largest recessions as episodes of fiscal stimulus, the 
CAPB only selects 9. It is thus more likely that the BFI interprets an economic 
downturn as an episode of fiscal expansionism. The imperfect cyclical adjustment 
problem (b) in the BFI thus might amplify the countercyclical response problem (a). 
Table 4 shows a similar picture for the case of economic upturns and fiscal 
consolidations. The results are less striking as in the case of fiscal stimuli in times of 
recession. While the BFI selects 9 of the 40 largest economic upturns as episodes of 
fiscal consolidation, the CAPB only selects 4. For instance, United Kingdom in 1988 
and New Zealand in 1993 and 1994 shows up as a case of large fiscal consolidation, 
while the CAPB-based approach does not show an increase in the CAPB of more than 
1.5 percentage points. It seems that the countercyclical response problem is less 
distinctive in the case of responding to economic upturns, however, the number of cases 
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in which the BFI selects a large episode of economic expansion as period of fiscal 
consolidation significantly increases (more than doubled), so that the effect of the 
imperfect cyclical adjustment (in A&P) should not be underrated. Figure 2 shows the 
correlation between changes in the economic cycle (output gap) and the CAPB (based 
on the Blanchard method) in the 40 largest episodes of economic upswings and 
downturns. It shows a clear negative relationship, suggesting that the BFI-based CAPB 
tends to be clearly more expansionary in economic recessions, compared to the large 
episodes of economic upswings (when the BFI-based CAPB seems to be more 
contractionary). From this picture, it is reasonable to assume a positive correlation 
between fiscal adjustments and GDP (either through a countercyclical response problem 
or expansionary austerity). 
Figure 3 depicts the same variables, but now the CAPB is calculated with standard 
assumptions of the OECD. The clear negative relationship decreases substantially. 
While the positive relationship is particularly pronounced in the case of economic 
downturns, it is less significant in the case of economic upswings, pointing to a small 
remaining countercyclical response problem in times of recessions (probably as a 
reaction to the oil price crises in 1975 and 1981), while there is little support for a large 
countercyclical response problem in the case of upswing episodes.
20
 
In summary, the CAPB based on the BFI appears to be highly correlated with changes 
in the economic cycle, while the CAPB based on conventional methods is not. This 
suggests that the BFI as proposed by A&P and applied by A&A (2010) suffers from an 
incomplete cyclical adjustment problem, as suggested by hypothesis (1). It is shown that 
the incomplete cyclical adjustment problem increases the likelihood of selecting an 
economic recession as a fiscal expansion and an economic upswing as an episode of 
fiscal consolidation. 
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 The same is true if the BFI (as computed by A&A) is contrasted with the augmented version of the BFI, 
rather than the CAPB of the OECD. The results are available upon request. 
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6. Replication and sensitivity of the results 
This section reproduces the evidence shown in A&A (2010) based on the BFI and 
shows the sensitivity of the results if CAPB as a fiscal indicator is cyclically-adjusted 
with different methods (A&P method vs. OECD method and augmented BFI).
 21
 
As discussed in the previous section, A&A (2010) examine episodes of large changes in 
the fiscal stance, if the BFI/CAPB increases/decreases by more than 1.5 percentage 
points. The selected episodes by this definition, for the BFI, the CAPB (OECD), as well 
as the augmented BFI, are shown in the appendix.
22
 Table 5 and 6 show the results of a 
replication of A&A (2010) with the BFI, the CAPB (OECD), and the augmented BFI as 
a fiscal indicator. A&A (2010) analyze the effect of changes in the CAPB on GDP in 
episodes of large changes in the fiscal stance with regressions of the following form: 
 
(18)    ititjit
j
jit uXcapbyy  
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Here, only cases of either large fiscal expansions or large fiscal consolidations are taken 
into account. Table 5 shows the results for the analysis of large episodes of fiscal 
expansions. While column (1) and (2) are perfect replications of the results in A&A, 
column (3) and (4) show the same results, with the only difference that the CAPB is 
used as provided by the OECD (from the OECD Economic outlook no. 84), rather than 
calculated with the A&P method. While the BFI (A&P) selects 72 episodes, the number 
of episodes selected by the CAPB (OECD) and the augmented BFI decreases 
substantially (65 and 64). While the positive (expansionary) effect of fiscal 
consolidations decreases after using the CAPB (OECD), the effect is not statistically 
significant in all three regressions (column 1, 3, 5). Column (2), (4) and (6) distinguish 
between the effect of current expenditure investment and revenue. The results based on 
the BFI and presented in A&A show a clear negative relationship between expenditure 
and growth in episodes of fiscal stimuli. This relationship has been widely interpreted as 
evidence for a negative multiplier in the case of expenditure cuts (A&A, 2010). 
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 Since the data is the same data as used by A&A, the results for the Blanchard method are perfect 
replications of the results in A&A. 
22
 Note that the episodes selected by the BFI are the same episodes as examined in A&A (2010).  
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However, using the OECD measure of the CAPB, this result decreases substantially and 
loses statistical significance (column 4). In column 6 the coefficient for expenditures 
even turns into opposite, after applying the augmented specification of the BFI, 
suggesting that the BFI, if correctly specified, does not produce results in support of 
expansionary fiscal contractions in the case of expenditures. 
Table 6 illustrates the results for fiscal adjustments. As in the case of fiscal stimuli 
(Table 5), the number of observations decreases (from 88 to 76 / 80) after using the 
CAPB (or the augmented BFI). Similar to the evidence in Table 5, the effect of fiscal 
consolidation based on the BFI is positive in column 1, suggesting evidence for 
expansionary austerity. The results based on the CAPB (OECD), however, shows that 
fiscal consolidations appear to be negatively associated with GDP growth, suggesting a 
Keynesian effect. Nevertheless, again the effect is not statistically significant in all 
specifications. Column 2, 4 and 6 distinguish between the effects of expenditure- and 
revenue- based fiscal consolidations. It turns out that the effect of revenues increases 
slightly if the OECD method is applied, while the effect of expenditure cuts on GDP 
decreases and loses statistical significance if the cyclical adjustment is based on the 
OECD method. Again, the negative effect of expenditures disappears after applying the 
augmented version of the BFI (table 6). The negative multiplier for results based on the 
BFI seems to be more pronounced in the case of expenditure cuts, compared to 
increases in revenues (hypothesis 4), representing the countercyclical response problem. 
Further, the evidence presented in Tables 5 and 6 is based on a limited number of 
observations so that it might be interesting to additionally analyze and compare the 
evidence based on the full sample and not rely only on the selective evidence for cases 
of large changes in fiscal policy. 
Table 7 replicates and compares another result of A&A (2010), that fiscal 
consolidations are positively associated with GDP, if the sample is not restricted to 
large episodes of discretionary change. We estimate regressions of the following form: 
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Here, the sample is not restricted to large cases of fiscal stimuli and adjustments, and 
includes country- and time fixed effects. Again, columns (1) and (2) present the 
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replication of the A&A results, while columns (3) and (4) show the results based on the 
CAPB (OECD), and (5) and (6) based on the augmented BFI. Comparing columns (1) 
and (3), the statistically significant positive effect of fiscal consolidation on GDP 
disappears after using the CAPB of the OECD (hypothesis 3). Using the augmented 
BFI, column (5) suggests that fiscal consolidations have negative rather than positive 
effects. Further, the negative multiplier for expenditures (column 2) decreases 
substantially if CAPB based measure rather than the BFI (column 4) is used and turns 
into opposite after using the augmented BFI (consistent with hypothesis 4). 
  
7. Dynamic effects 
 
This section includes dynamic effects of fiscal policy on GDP and investigates whether 
the results change after excluding large episodes of fiscal expansions and analyzing only 
episodes of large increases in the CAPB in a large panel of OECD countries. At the 
same time, we compare the results based on the three different methods to adjust for 
cyclical effects. To analyze the dynamic effects of fiscal consolidations on GDP and 
how this is influenced by the strategy of how to adjust for cyclical effects, we apply the 
method proposed by Leigh et al. (2010) and Alesina and Ardagna (2013):  
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Again, ity represents real GDP growth in country i at time t and 
FA
itcab  denotes the 
estimated change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (as a percentage of GDP) in 
periods of large fiscal adjustments ( kitcapb   > 1.5 p.p. of GDP) and zero otherwise.
23
 
As in chapter 5, we distinguish between three strategies to adjust for cyclical effects, the 
BFI method as proposed by Alesina and Perotti (1995), the conventional (OECD) 
method, as proposed by Girouard and André (2005), and the augmented BFI as 
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 In an augmented specification I include changes in cyclically-adjusted current revenues and changes in 
cyclically-adjusted current primary spending in periods of large fiscal adjustments, rather than changes in 
the CAB during the same year. 
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proposed in section two of this paper.
24
 i  and t  represent cross-section and time 
fixed effects, respectively.  
Table 8 shows the results of this augmented specification. Since A&A (2010) did not 
compute dynamic responses of fiscal policy, this table is not a replication of A&A 
(2010), however, since the sample and data is almost similar, it is comparable to A&A 
(2013), where dynamic responses of changes in fiscal policy based on the BFI (A&P) 
are estimated within a similar framework. 
Column (1) shows a positive association between fiscal adjustments and GDP growth, 
however, the result is not statistically significant. This coefficient changes its sign in 
column (3), after using the c.a. strategy of the OECD and after applying the augmented 
version of the BFI (column 5). Furthermore, column (2) shows a strong non-Keynesian 
effect of expenditure cuts on GDP (based on the BFI, according to A&A), but the result 
turns into opposite after using the OECD measure or the augmented BFI. This clearly 
supports hypothesis 3 and 4 which states that the BFI-based results are biased towards 
expansionary effects and that this bias is particularly pronounced for expenditure cuts. 
Column (4) and (6) additionally suggest that the (negative) effects of revenue-based 
consolidations are underestimated in the case of the BFI-based measure.  
Figure 4 depicts the dynamic effects of changes in fiscal policy based on the results of 
equation (20), where there is a distinguishment between the estimated effect of large 
changes in the CAPB as calculated by the method proposed by A&P (1995) and large 
changes in the CAPB as provided by the OECD. Similar to A&A (2013), dynamic 
response functions are computed with the delta method, depicting the estimated 
response of GDP to a one-percentage point fiscal consolidation after a given period. 
According to the estimated regressions (table 8), the dynamic response varies with the 
measure of fiscal policy. 
A comparison of the results show that the estimated contractionary effect of fiscal 
adjustments based on the CAPB (OECD approach) is more pronounced, compared to 
the results based on the A&A method. While the response of the BFI-based 
consolidation shows some evidence for potential expansionary effects of fiscal 
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 The data and sample in this study again is the same as in A&A (2010), while the results for the 
alternative fiscal indicators use data of the OECD Economic Outlook No. 84 (same source as used in 
A&A, 2010). 
 22   
 
adjustment, the results based on the CAPB (OECD approach) are relatively 
contractionary, in line with hypothesis (3). 
Figure 5 shows the estimated effect of a one percent point increase in current revenues. 
In line with hypothesis 4, the estimated effects of both approaches are relatively similar 
and contractionary, what is not surprising, given that the elasticity of revenues is usually 
assumed to be approximately one, so that the revenue-GDP-ratio does not necessarily 
need to be adjusted for automatic cyclical effects. 
Figure 6 shows the same results for expenditure cuts. The estimated effect of a one 
percent point reduction in primary expenditures is very different in both approaches, 
depending on the method applied to adjust the data for cyclical effects. The A&P 
approach finds expansionary effects of fiscal adjustments at the spending side. The 
(negative) impact multiplier is estimated to be -0.3 and turns out to be -0.4 after two 
years.
25
 If the data provided by the OECD is used, the result is the opposite. The impact 
multiplier is 0.1 (positive), suggesting that a reduction in government spending has a 
negative impact on GDP. This observation is in line with hypothesis (4), where a 
negative correlation is expected between GDP growth and the expenditure-GDP ratio, if 
we fail to correct the expenditure-GDP ratio for cyclical effects.
26
 
In this line, figure 7, 8, and 9 depict the response of GDP after a one percentage point 
fiscal consolidation, and compares the BFI-based (A&A) results with results based on 
the augmented BFI. Summarizing, the results support the view that the BFI as computed 
by A&A underestimates the contractionary effects of expenditure based consolidations. 
Since the conventional approach has been criticized for not controlling for one-off 
operations (Guajardo et al, 2014), an alternative CAPB of the OECD was used, which 
excludes one-off operations, the so-called underlying balance.
27
 As a test for robustness, 
all regressions are estimated using this indicator alternatively. After using the 
underlying balance, most of the results turn out to be even more pronounced and 
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 These results are very much in line with the results in Alesina and Ardagna (2013), who found that a 
one percent point reduction in government spending increases GDP by 0.15 percent in the same year and 
by 0.46 percent after two years. 
26
 Alesina and Ardagna (2010) state that their results are not affected by the method applied to adjust for 
cyclical effects, and that the results remain robust, even without controlling for cyclical effects. Indeed, 
the estimated effects of fiscal consolidations based on the A&P approach are almost identical to those 
estimated with unadjusted data. To address this question, I compute the results based on unadjusted data, 
compared to the results based on the CAPB. The results based on this measure are available upon request. 
27
 Refer to Joumard et al. (2008) for a discussion on how one-off operations influence the budget balance 
and the definition of the underlying primary balance. 
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statistically significant, compared to the CAPB-based ones.
28
 Nevertheless, since the 
intention of this paper is the illustration of the incomplete cyclical adjustment problem 
in the literature following the method proposed by A&P (1995) at this point there is no 
extensive discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of using this alternative 
indicator.  
 
8. Conclusion 
A large share of empirical literature on fiscal policy using the conventional approach 
pioneered by Alesina and Perotti (1995) examines changes in cyclically-adjusted budget 
balances (CAPB) and finds a positive relationship between CAPB (computed with the 
A&P-method) and GDP (non-Keynesian effects or expansionary austerity). This 
counter-intuitive relationship has been found to be particularly pronounced in the case 
of government spending (wage- and non-wage consumption expenditure). This stream 
of literature highlights that adjustments at the spending side are likely to be successful 
(in reducing government debt) or expansionary, while this is not the case for revenue-
based consolidations (for example A&A, 1998, 2010 and 2013). 
A number of authors have criticized these findings and pointed to potential conflicts 
with endogeneity. For instance, Jayadev and Konczal (2010) and De Cos and Moral-
Benito (2013) found that the evidence on expansionary austerity in A&A (2010) is 
mainly based on successful adjustments in an economic upswing. 
Guajardo et al. (2014) contrasted the data-based evidence in A&A (2010) with new 
evidence based on narrative measures of fiscal consolidations. They show that the data-
based fiscal consolidations are correlated with economic growth forecast revisions. 
Nevertheless, the literature so far has not identified why the CAPB as proposed by A&P 
is endogenous to growth and how the assumptions made in A&P change the resulting 
estimated fiscal multiplier in data-based analyses of fiscal policy. Some studies 
highlight the presence of a countercyclical response problem (de Coz and Moral-Benito, 
2013, and Guajardo et al., 2014), while others discuss the failure of the BFI to address 
the fiscal effects of changes in asset prices (Guajardo et al., 2014 and Yang et al., 2015). 
However, both hypotheses do not explain why the CAPB computed with other standard 
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 More on this is available upon request. 
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methods is not (or less) endogenous to growth, a finding that is shown in this paper. The 
reverse causality argument can be seen as an answer to this puzzle. 
The reverse causality argument proposed in this article focuses on the incomplete 
cyclical adjustment problem in the approach of A&P (1995) to adjust for cyclical effects 
in budgetary data with the help of the “Blanchard method” to compute the Blanchard 
fiscal indicator (BFI), which is relevant in a large number of subsequent studies based 
on the same approach, as for instance A&A (1998, 2010 and 2013), as well as Ardagna 
(2002 and 2009). It is shown that the cyclical adjustment strategy pioneered by A&P 
(1995) and applied in a number of subsequent articles is prone to an imperfect cyclical 
adjustment problem (following the definition of Perotti, 2013). Only Holden and 
Midthjell (2013) pointed to a potential reverse causality problem in A&A (2010) when 
analyzing whether fiscal policies might be successful in reducing government debt, but 
without discussing the assumptions made in A&P and how this affects the estimated 
fiscal multiplier.  
The critique of the A&P method proposed in this paper is that A&P implicitly assume 
an elasticity of government expenditure (other than transfers) with respect to GDP of 
one (or close to one) when calculating the Blanchard Fiscal Indicator (BFI). Conversely, 
standard cyclical adjustment procedures assume an elasticity of zero for expenditures 
other than transfers (Girouard and André, 2005). The theoretical discussion in this paper 
states that the imperfect cyclical adjustment problem influences the estimated multiplier 
in conventional (data-based) analyses of fiscal policy so that the results are 
endogenously biased towards expansionary austerity. This paper highlights that the 
results in A&A are affected by reverse causality, i.e. increasing GDP decreases 
expenditure-GDP-ratios, if the method applied fails to adjust for cyclical effects. It is 
shown theoretically and empirically that the cyclical adjustment strategy proposed by 
A&P does not appropriately control for cyclical effects. 
The empirical discussion in this paper examines the data used in one of the most 
prominent studies in the literature on expansionary fiscal consolidations, A&A (2010), 
which is based on the method proposed by A&P. Further, the data and results of A&A 
(2010) are contrasted with cyclically-adjusted data, as provided by the OECD, as well 
as an augmented version of the BFI, which is designed to solve the issue of reverse 
causation to improve the Blanchard method, and respective results. 
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It is shown that the CAPB based on the A&P method is positively correlated with 
changes in the economic cycle, while the CAPB based on conventional methods (and 
with the augmented version of the BFI) is not, pointing to the fact that the fiscal 
indicator used in A&A entails cyclical fluctuations and so the results of their approach 
are prone to reverse causality.  
Investigating large changes in the output gap, it is shown that the strategy proposed by 
A&P increases the likelihood that a large episode of economic downturn is selected as 
an episode of a large fiscal stimulus by the method applied in A&A (2010), so that a 
large share of cases of fiscal stimuli as examined by A&A (2010) are affected by 
cyclical increases in deficits, rather than structural stimuli. In this line, the cyclical 
adjustment strategy proposed by A&P increases the likelihood that an episode of large 
economic upswing is selected as an episode of fiscal consolidation, since the cyclically 
adjustment procedure fails to disentangle the endogenous cyclical increase in the budget 
balance and the exogenous discretionary change in the fiscal stance. The imperfect 
cyclical adjustment problem particularly affects the expenditure-GDP-ratio, so that an 
increase in GDP is associated with decreases in the expenditure-GDP-ratio, while the 
(non-) adjustment of revenues in the approach of A&P does not affect the results in a 
systematic pattern. 
Replicating the results presented in A&A (2010), and comparing the results based on 
the Blanchard-method with the results based on an alternative CAPB-based measure 
(where the CAPB is cyclically-adjusted with standard assumptions based on the method 
proposed by Girouard and André, 2005, as well as an augmented BFI), it is shown that 
the expansionary effect of fiscal consolidations disappears after controlling for cyclical 
effects with the help of standard assumptions, rather than the method proposed by A&P. 
The reverse causality argument proposed in this paper might help systemizing a number 
of controversies in the recent literature. For example, it explains why the evidence on 
expansionary austerity is particularly based on cases where output operates above 
potential (Jayadev and Konczal, 2010; de Cos and Moral-Benito, 2013; Jordà and 
Taylor, 2015) and why previous research has discovered that fiscal consolidations in 
A&A are endogenous to growth. It also explains why the literature based on the A&P 
approach suggests that cuts in government expenditure are associated with 
macroeconomic expansions, while increasing revenues (as a ratio to GDP) are 
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contractive. While the latter finding is in line with the theoretical literature, the finding 
of expansionary effects in the case of expenditure cuts has been frequently highlighted 
in the academic debate as well as among policy-makers during the European fiscal crisis 
(see for example, BMF, 2012). 
In this article it is shown that this finding reflects reverse causation, i.e. cyclical 
increases in the budget as a result of an economic upswing, rather than an economic 
upswing resulting from a discretionary cut in government expenditures. 
This article might also contribute to the literature in a more general way. Some 
contributions have been critical regarding conventional analyses of fiscal policy in the 
recent past (Guajardo et al, 2014). Nevertheless, there is an urgent need to analyze 
budget data and to improve cyclical adjustment strategies to proxy discretionary 
changes in fiscal policy and to estimate cyclically-adjusted budget data, as for example 
in the context of the newly established fiscal rules in Europe. 
In this article it is shown that it is not the conventional approach in general, rather than a 
specific method of how to adjust the budget balance for cyclical effects that flaws the 
results in previous analyses based on the conventional approach. In line with Yang et al. 
(2015), this article shows that the conventional approach per se is applicable if the 
cyclical position of the budget is correctly taken into account. Of course, there are other 
issues, as for instance the counter-cyclical response problem, as highlighted by Perotti 
(2013), as well as the presence of one-off operations (Guajardo et al, 2014), that need to 
be tackled to further improve the conventional approach. Nevertheless, the paper at 
hand is one step in this direction by addressing the incomplete cyclical adjustment 
problem. It establishes a new Blanchard method to compute an augmented version of 
the Blanchard Fiscal Indicator (BFI) that is designed to solve the incomplete cyclical 
adjustment problem of the previous literature using the BFI (see e.g. A&P, 1995, A&A, 
1998, 2010, 2013, and Ardagna, 2004, 2009). The present fiscal crisis in Europe has 
shown that estimations of potential output (and structural deficits) are prone to 
extensive revisions, so that real-time estimates of structural balances are of limited use. 
In line with Blanchard (1990) it would thus be reasonable to establish an alternative 
fiscal indicator which is not prone to large revisions and arbitrary measurement issues. 
In this line, this paper can be seen a critique and a rehabilitation of the conventional 
approach and the Blanchard Fiscal Indicator. 
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Table 1: Consequences of imperfect cyclical adjustment under different 
assumptions on revenue- and spending elasticities 
 
If Relation to gap Effect on the estimated multiplier 
R >1 R/Y (positive) Underestimation of the (negative) revenue multiplier 
R <1 R/Y (negative) Overestimation of the (negative) revenue multiplier 
G >1 G/Y (positive) Overestimation of the (positive) expenditure multiplier 
G <1 G/Y (negative) Underestimation of the (positive) expenditure multiplier 
 
 
Table 2: Fiscal policy and changes in the output gap 
Equation estimated: ΔFit = µi + λt + 𝛾ΔGapit + ɛit 
Measure of ΔF β s.e. R-squared Obs 
     
ΔPB 0.350*** 0.061 0.298 669 
ΔCAPB (BFI, A&A) 0.188*** 0.059 0.228 668 
ΔCAPB (OECD) 0.019 0.052 0.160 653 
ΔCAPB (Augmented BFI) -0.116** 0.055 0.168 668 
     
Current revenues β s.e. R-squared Obs 
     
ΔR -0.107* 0.060 0.179 669 
ΔCAR (BFI, A&A) -0.063 0.046 0.122 668 
ΔCAR (OECD) -0.006 0.055 0.168 653 
ΔCAR (Augmented BFI) -0.031 0.047 0.120 668 
     
Current expenditures β s.e. R-squared Obs 
     
ΔE -0.409*** 0.062 0.540 669 
ΔCAE (A&A) -0.222*** 0.047 0.331 668 
ΔCAE (OECD) 0.007 0.042 0.255 668 
ΔCAE (Augmented BFI) 0.092** 0.038 0.217 668 
     
Notes: The table reports point estimates and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. All specifications 
contain full set of country and time fixed effects (not reported in the table). 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 3: 40 largest cases of economic downturns 
Country Year BFI DCAPB DGAP BFI>1.5 CAPB<-1.5 
Finland 1991 4.73 -2.90 -7.88 1 1 
Japan 1974 -0.09 0.69 -5.60 
  Italy 1975 3.56 -1.63 -5.58 1 1 
Canada 1982 2.02 -1.20 -5.52 1 
 Portugal 1993 2.59 -2.34 -5.00 1 1 
Finland 1992 1.75 -1.64 -4.73 1 1 
Portugal 1984 -0.65 1.53 -4.65 
  United States 1982 0.34 -1.02 -4.63 
  Belgium 1975 2.53 0.34 -4.37 1 
 Canada 1991 1.65 -0.67 -4.28 1 
 Spain 1993 3.47 -0.48 -4.09 1 
 United Kingdom 1980 -0.66 1.79 -3.91 
  Greece 1987 -1.17 2.47 -3.78 
  Austria 1975 3.22 -2.16 -3.73 1 1 
Sweden 1977 4.56 -3.16 -3.71 1 1 
Australia 1991 2.61 -1.96 -3.62 1 1 
United States 1974 0.05 -0.09 -3.61 
  Switzerland 1991 0.32 -0.09 -3.44 
  Ireland 1986 -0.22 1.50 -3.40 
  Austria 1978 0.35 0.44 -3.36 
  Ireland 1983 -1.39 3.42 -3.36 
  Japan 1998 5.38 -6.06 -3.28 1 1 
United States 1980 0.24 -0.74 -3.23 
  United States 1975 1.34 -2.85 -3.22 
 
1 
France 1975 1.96 -0.52 -3.20 1 
 Portugal 1983 -2.39 3.91 -3.19 
  United Kingdom 1991 1.64 -0.62 -3.17 1 
 New Zealand 1991 -0.43 1.10 -3.16 
  Australia 1982 0.39 -0.10 -3.16 
  Denmark 1981 1.99 -1.36 -3.16 1 
 United Kingdom 1981 0.82 0.47 -3.09 
  Sweden 1993 -0.72 0.38 -3.07 
  Ireland 1991 0.73 0.06 -3.04 
  Austria 1981 -0.32 1.24 -3.03 
  United States 1991 -0.60 0.39 -3.02 
  Australia 1983 0.12 0.19 -2.96 
  Norway 1989 -2.97 -0.74 -2.94 
  United Kingdom 1974 -0.16 0.65 -2.91 
  Belgium 1993 -0.67 2.10 -2.91 
  Norway 1988 -0.12 -0.36 -2.89 
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Table 4: 40 largest cases of economic upswings 
Country Year BFI DCAPB DGAP BFI<-1.5 DCAPB>1.5 
United Kingdom 1973 2.26 -3.75 4.95 
  Portugal 1988 -1.92 1.12 4.39 1 
 Denmark 1976 -1.01 0.07 4.06 
  Ireland 1990 -0.06 -1.49 3.87 
  Greece 1978 -0.04 -1.09 3.81 
  United States 1984 0.85 0.02 3.67 
  Norway 1985 -1.15 0.37 3.63 
  Portugal 1989 -0.08 -0.88 3.59 
  Japan 1973 -0.36 -0.12 3.59 
  Finland 1979 1.00 -1.69 3.47 
  Portugal 1987 0.73 -1.09 3.25 
  Australia 1984 0.13 -0.22 3.19 
  Japan 1972 0.86 -1.77 3.13 
  Finland 1997 -1.07 1.14 3.08 
  Belgium 1973 -1.09 -0.32 3.07 
  Finland 1989 -1.12 0.21 3.04 
  Italy 1976 -2.43 2.15 3.01 1 1 
Canada 1984 -0.77 -0.07 2.99 
  Spain 1987 -2.88 1.71 2.98 1 1 
Ireland 1997 -1.10 0.15 2.90 
  Denmark 1994 0.62 -0.60 2.89 
  Finland 1988 -3.34 2.37 2.85 1 1 
Japan 1988 0.15 -0.07 2.76 
  United Kingdom 1988 -1.66 0.63 2.75 1 
 Belgium 1976 0.02 -0.92 2.74 
  Denmark 1986 -3.64 3.55 2.73 1 1 
New Zealand 1994 -2.07 1.40 2.69 1 
 Austria 1979 -0.29 -0.23 2.66 
  Greece 1988 1.01 -2.02 2.56 
  United States 1973 -0.55 0.40 2.55 
  New Zealand 1993 -1.89 1.05 2.53 1 
 Netherlands 1976 -0.21 0.83 2.53 
  Canada 1973 -1.06 0.47 2.50 
  Belgium 1988 -0.45 -0.81 2.45 
  United States 1978 0.08 0.17 2.43 
  Italy 1979 0.03 -0.61 2.41 
  Sweden 1984 -2.30 1.20 2.41 1 
 Ireland 1999 0.35 -1.27 2.34 
  Canada 1999 -0.79 0.33 2.29 
  Canada 1988 -0.72 0.26 2.28 
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Table 5: Fiscal Stimulus and Growth 
 
Equation estimated: ΔYit =𝛼1ΔYit-1 + 𝛼2ΔYit-2 +𝛽𝑋+ 𝛾ΔFSit + ɛit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Blanchard method 
Replication of A&A 
CAPB-based (OECD) Blanchard method 
Augmented 
     
GDP growth (t-1) 0.468*** 0.484*** 0.528*** 0.542*** 0.252 0.225 
 (0.147) (0.133) (0.165) (0.164) (0.185) (0.179) 
GDP growth (t-2) -0.162 -0.081 -0.219 -0.245 -0.064 -0.160 
 (0.139) (0.134) (0.149) (0.151) (0.164) (0.164) 
G7 growth (t-1) 0.364* 0.272 0.308 0.272 0.305 0.253 
 (0.202) (0.185) (0.232) (0.229) (0.232) (0.225) 
Debt (t-1) -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.014 -0.006 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) 
Expenditure  -0.751***  -0.367  0.214 
  (0.262)  (0.433)  (0.378) 
Investment  -0.255  0.144  -0.427* 
  (0.185)  (0.225)  (0.244) 
Revenues  -0.177  -0.189  -0.435 
  (0.285)  (0.375)  (0.380) 
Consolidation 0.283  0.113  0.291  
 (0.187)  (0.228)  (0.247)  
Constant 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.017 0.023** 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) 
       
Observations 72 72 65 65 64 64 
R-squared 0.282 0.428 0.285 0.332 0.117 0.208 
Notes: The table reports point estimates and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.  
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table 6: Fiscal Adjustments and Growth 
 
Equation estimated: ΔYit =𝛼1ΔYit-1 + 𝛼2ΔYit-2 +𝛽𝑋+ 𝛾ΔFAit + ɛit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLE Blanchard method 
Replication of A&A 
CAPB-based (OECD) Blanchard method 
Augmented 
       
GDP growth (t-1) 0.296*** 0.288*** -0.004 -0.000 0.330*** 0.363*** 
 (0.099) (0.092) (0.137) (0.134) (0.121) (0.126) 
GDP growth (t-2) -0.001 0.082 0.069 0.068 -0.046 -0.042 
 (0.088) (0.084) (0.115) (0.111) (0.107) (0.109) 
G7 growth (t-1) 0.116 0.038 0.210 0.001 0.191 0.132 
 (0.151) (0.142) (0.204) (0.211) (0.172) (0.183) 
Debt (t-1) -0.011* -0.007 -0.012* -0.015** -0.010* -0.010 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Expenditure  -0.434**  -0.313  -0.081 
  (0.170)  (0.291)  (0.207) 
Investment  0.082  -0.067  -0.064 
  (0.136)  (0.172)  (0.159) 
Revenues  -0.216  -0.455*  -0.117 
  (0.199)  (0.260)  (0.232) 
Consolidation 0.044  -0.081  0.052  
 (0.134)  (0.173)  (0.147)  
Constant 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.039*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
       
Observations 88 88 76 76 80 80 
R-squared 0.218 0.348 0.073 0.170 0.208 0.219 
Notes: The table reports point estimates and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table 7: Fiscal Policy and GDP Growth 
 
Equation estimated: ΔYit =𝛼1ΔYit-1 + 𝛼2ΔYit-2 +𝛽𝑋+ 𝛾ΔFit + µi + λt + ɛit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Blanchard method 
Replication of A&A 
CAPB-based (OECD) Blanchard method 
Augmented 
       
GDP growth (t-1) 0.352*** 0.367*** 0.351*** 0.346*** 0.357*** 0.371*** 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
GDP growth (t-2) -0.038 0.016 -0.045 -0.036 -0.044 -0.040 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Debt (t-1) -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Expenditure  -0.508***  -0.169**  0.123* 
  (0.061)  (0.082)  (0.071) 
Investment  -0.070  0.057  -0.075 
  (0.060)  (0.062)  (0.065) 
Revenue  -0.121**  -0.099  -0.207*** 
  (0.061)  (0.066)  (0.065) 
Consolidation 0.154***  0.028  -0.072*  
 (0.039)  (0.042)  (0.040)  
       
Observations 569 569 566 566 569 569 
R-squared 0.500 0.562 0.482 0.491 0.487 0.496 
Countries 21 21 21 21 21 21 
R-squared within 0.500 0.562 0.482 0.491 0.487 0.496 
R-squared between 0.872 0.802 0.886 0.846 0.897 0.899 
R-squared overall 0.504 0.571 0.488 0.499 0.493 0.505 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table 8: Dynamic response of GDP to fiscal consolidation 
 
Equation estimated: ΔYit =𝛼1ΔYit-1 + 𝛼2ΔYit-2 +𝛽𝑋+ 𝛾0ΔFAit +𝛾1ΔFAit-1 +𝛾2ΔFAit-2 + µi + λt + ɛit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Blanchard method 
Replication of A&A 
CAPB-based (OECD) Blanchard method 
Augmented 
       
GDP growth (t-1) 0.319*** 0.325*** 0.391*** 0.394*** 0.302*** 0.309*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) 
GDP growth (t-2) -0.019 -0.014 -0.029 -0.018 -0.022 -0.012 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
Revenues  -0.101  -0.140  -0.328*** 
  (0.133)  (0.125)  (0.125) 
Revenues (t-1)  -0.049  -0.314**  -0.206 
  (0.134)  (0.125)  (0.127) 
Revenues (t-2)  0.092  -0.014  0.020 
  (0.133)  (0.126)  (0.128) 
Expenditure  -0.286**  0.123  0.440*** 
  (0.132)  (0.193)  (0.145) 
Expenditure (t-1)  -0.034  -0.115  -0.191 
  (0.133)  (0.193)  (0.147) 
Expenditure (t-2)  0.086  -0.062  0.136 
  (0.131)  (0.188)  (0.144) 
Consolidation 0.036  -0.078  -0.238***  
 (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.068)  
Consolidation (t-1) 0.007  -0.082  -0.023  
 (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.069)  
Consolidation (t-2) -0.025  0.002  -0.020  
 (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.069)  
       
Observations 662 662 611 611 662 662 
R-squared 0.395 0.401 0.447 0.452 0.407 0.413 
Countries 21 21 21 21 21 21 
R-squared within 0.395 0.401 0.447 0.452 0.407 0.413 
R-squared between 0.921 0.928 0.954 0.941 0.850 0.745 
R-squared overall 0.407 0.417 0.468 0.475 0.410 0.415 
Notes: The table reports point estimates and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. All specifications 
contain full set of country and time fixed effects (not reported in the table). 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Figure 1: Indicators of fiscal policy (A&P and OECD) vs. output gap 
 
a) CAPB, A&P b) CAPB, OECD 
 
c) Revenues, A&P d) Revenues, OECD 
 
e) Expenditure, A&P f) Expenditure, OECD 
 
Source: Alesina and Ardagna (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84. 
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Figure 2: ∆CAPB (A&P) vs. ∆Gap in large episodes of up- and downswing 
 
 
 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook, No. 84, own calculations. 
 
Figure 3: ∆CAPB (OECD) vs. ∆Gap in large episodes of up- and downswing 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, No. 84, own calculations. 
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Figure 4: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation  
 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted lines delineate one 
standard error confidence bands.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP revenue-based fiscal consolidation  
 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP revenue-based fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted 
lines delineate one standard error confidence bands. 
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Figure 6: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP expenditure-based fiscal consolidation  
 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP expenditure-based fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted 
lines delineate one standard error confidence bands. 
 
 
Figure 7: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation (“old” BFI vs. “new” BFI) 
 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted lines delineate one 
standard error confidence bands. 
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Figure 8: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP revenue-based fiscal consolidation (“old” BFI 
vs. “new” BFI) 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP revenue-based fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted 
lines delineate one standard error confidence bands. 
 
 
Figure 9: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP expenditure-based fiscal consolidation (“old” 
BFI vs. “new” BFI) 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP expenditure-based fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted 
lines delineate one standard error confidence bands. 
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For Online Publication: Appendix 
 
 
Table A1 
 
Fiscal Stimuli (“old” BFI) 
 
Country  Fiscal Stimuli (c.a. with the “old” Blanchard method) 
 
Australia 1990  1991 
Austria 1975 2004 
Belgium 1975 1981 2005 
Canada 1975 1982 1991 2001 
Denmark 1974 1975 1980 1981 1982 
Finland 1978 1982 1983 1987 1990 1991 1992 2001 2003 
France  1975 1981 1992 1993 2002 
Germany 1995 2001  
Greece  1981 1985 1989 1995 2001 
Ireland  1974 1975 1978 2001 2007 
Italy  1972 1975 1981 2001   
Japan  1975 1993 1998 2005 2007 
Netherlands 1975 1980 1995 2001 2002 
New Zealand 1988 
Norway 1974 1976 1977 1986 1987 1991 1998 2002 2007 
Portugal 1978 1985 1993 2005 
Spain  1981 1982 1993 
Sweden 1974 1977 1978 1979 1980 1991 1992 2001 2002 
Switzerland  
U. Kingdom 1971 1972 1973 1990 1991 1992 2001 2002 2003 
United States 2002 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table A2 
 
Fiscal Adjustments (“old” BFI) 
 
Country  Fiscal Adjustment (c.a. with the “old” Blanchard method) 
 
Australia 1987 1988 
Austria 1984 1996 1997 2005 
Belgium 1982 1984 1987 2006 
Canada 1981 1986 1987 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Denmark 1983 1984 1985 1986 2005 
Finland 1973 1976 1981 1984 1988 1994 1996 1998 2000 
France  1979 1996 
Germany 1996 2000 
Greece  1976 1986 1991 1994 1996 2005 2006 
Ireland  1976 1984 1987 1988 1989 2000 
Italy  1976 1980 1982 1990 1991 1992 1997 2007   
Japan  1984 1999 2001 2006 
Netherlands 1972 1973 1983 1988 1991 1993 1996  
New Zealand 1987 1989 1993 1994 2000 
Norway 1979 1980 1983 1989 1996 2000 2004 2005 
Portugal 1982 1983 1986 1988 1992 1995 2002 2006 
Spain  1986 1987 1994 1996  
Sweden 1981 1983 1984 1986 1987 1994 1995 1996 1997 2004 
Switzerland  
U. Kingdom 1977 1982 1988 1996 1997 1998 2000 
United States  
 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table A3 
 
Fiscal Stimuli (CAPB) 
 
Country Fiscal stimuli (CAPB) 
 
Australia 1991 
Austria 1975 2004 
Belgium 1972 1980 1981 2005  
Canada  1975 1977 2001 
Denmark 1975 1982  
Finland 1978 1979 1982 1987 1990 1991 1992 2001 
France    
Germany 1995 2001  
Greece  1981 1985 1988 1989 1995 2001 2003 2004 
Ireland  2001 2007 
Italy  1975 1981 2001 
Japan  1972 1975 1978 1993 1998 
Netherlands 1975 1978 1989 1995 2001 
New Zealand 1988 
Norway 1987 1990 1991 1992 1996 2000 2003 
Portugal 1985 1993 2005 
Spain  1990 
Sweden 1974 1977 1978 1979 1980 1991 1992 2001 2002 
Switzerland  
U. Kingdom 1973 1978 1990 1992 2002 2003 
United States 1975 2001 2002 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table A4 
 
Fiscal Adjustments (CAPB) 
 
Country  Fiscal adjustment (CAPB) 
 
Australia 1998 
Austria 1984 1996 1997 2001 2005 
Belgium 1977 1982 1984 1993 2006 
Canada 1981 1986 1987 1995 1996 1997 
Denmark 1983 1984 1986 2004 2005 
Finland 1981 1984 1988 1994 1996 1998 2000  
France  1996 
Germany 1996  
Greece  1986 1987 1991 1994 1996 2005 2006 
Ireland  1983 1984 1986 1987 1988  
Italy  1976 1982 1983 1991 1992 1993 1997 2007   
Japan  1984 1999 2006 
Netherlands 1972 1983 1991 1993 1996 2004  
New Zealand 1987 1989 2000 
Norway 1983 1994 1995 2007  
Portugal 1982 1983 1984 1986 1992 2002 2006 
Spain  1987 1992 1996   
Sweden 1976 1981 1986 1987 1994 1996 1997 1998 
Switzerland  
U. Kingdom 1980 1982 1996 1997 1998 
United States 1976 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table A5 
 
Fiscal Stimuli (BFI, augmented) 
 
Country  Fiscal Stimuli (c.a. with the augmented Blanchard method) 
 
Australia  
Austria 1975 1976 2004 
Belgium 1972 1976 1980 1981 2005 
Canada 1975 2001 
Denmark 1975 1982 1994 2006 
Finland 1972 1978 1979 1982 1983 1987 1991 2001 2003 
France   
Germany 1995 2001  
Greece  1972 1975 1981 1985 1988 1989 1995 2001 2003 2004 
Ireland  1974 1975 1978 2001 2007 
Italy  1972 1975 1981 2001   
Japan  1972 1975 1993 1998 2005 2007 
Netherlands 1974 1975 1989 1995 2001  
New Zealand 1988 
Norway 1974 1976 1977 1986 1991 1997 1998 2002 2007 
Portugal 1978 1985 1990 2005 
Spain  1993 
Sweden 1974 1977 1978 1979 1980 1992 2001 2002 
Switzerland  
U. Kingdom 1971 1972 1973 1978 1992 2001 2002 2003 
United States 2002 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table A6 
 
Fiscal Adjustments (BFI, augmented) 
 
Country  Fiscal Adjustment (c.a. with the augmented Blanchard method) 
 
Australia  
Austria 1984 1996 1997 2005 
Belgium 1982 1984 1987 1993  2006 
Canada 1981 1986 1995 1996 1997 
Denmark 1983 1984 1986 2005 
Finland 1976 1981 1984 1988 1994 1996 2000 
France  1996 
Germany 1996 2000 
Greece  1986 1987 1991 1994 2005 2006 
Ireland  1976 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1989 2003 2004 2006 
Italy  1982 1990 1991 1992 1997 2007   
Japan  1984 1999 2001 2006 
Netherlands 1982 1983 1988 1991 1993 1996 2005 
New Zealand 1987 1989 2000 
Norway 1979 1980 1983 1989 1999 2000 2004 2005 
Portugal 1982 1983 1984 1986 1992 2002 2006 
Spain  1983 1987 1994 1996  
Sweden 1976 1981 1986 1987 1993 1994 1996 1997 
Switzerland  
U. Kingdom 1977 1980 1982 1996 1997 1998 2000 
United States  
 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
